Security and Hardening
Overview
Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.
When to Use
Building anything that accepts user input
Implementing authentication or authorization
Storing or transmitting sensitive data
Integrating with external APIs or services
Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
Handling payment or PII data
The Three-Tier Boundary System
Always Do (No Exceptions)
Validate all external input
at the system boundary (API routes, form handlers)
Parameterize all database queries
— never concatenate user input into SQL
Encode output
to prevent XSS (use framework auto-escaping, don't bypass it)
Use HTTPS
for all external communication
Hash passwords
with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (never store plaintext)
Set security headers
(CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
Use httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies
for sessions
Run
npm audit
(or equivalent) before every release
Ask First (Requires Human Approval)
Adding new authentication flows or changing auth logic
Storing new categories of sensitive data (PII, payment info)
Adding new external service integrations
Changing CORS configuration
Adding file upload handlers
Modifying rate limiting or throttling
Granting elevated permissions or roles
Never Do
Never commit secrets
to version control (API keys, passwords, tokens)
Never log sensitive data
(passwords, tokens, full credit card numbers)
Never trust client-side validation
as a security boundary
Never disable security headers
for convenience
Never use
eval()
or
innerHTML
with user-provided data
Never store sessions in client-accessible storage
(localStorage for auth tokens)
Never expose stack traces
or internal error details to users
OWASP Top 10 Prevention
1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS Command)
// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
const
query
=
SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '
${
userId
}
'
;
// GOOD: Parameterized query
const
user
=
await
db
.
query
(
'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1'
,
[
userId
]
)
;
// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
const
user
=
await
prisma
.
user
.
findUnique
(
{
where
:
{
id
:
userId
}
}
)
;
2. Broken Authentication
// Password hashing
import
{
hash
,
compare
}
from
'bcrypt'
;
const
SALT_ROUNDS
=
12
;
const
hashedPassword
=
await
hash
(
plaintext
,
SALT_ROUNDS
)
;
const
isValid
=
await
compare
(
plaintext
,
hashedPassword
)
;
// Session management
app
.
use
(
session
(
{
secret
:
process
.
env
.
SESSION_SECRET
,
// From environment, not code
resave
:
false
,
saveUninitialized
:
false
,
cookie
:
{
httpOnly
:
true
,
// Not accessible via JavaScript
secure
:
true
,
// HTTPS only
sameSite
:
'lax'
,
// CSRF protection
maxAge
:
24
*
60
*
60
*
1000
,
// 24 hours
}
,
}
)
)
;
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
element
.
innerHTML
=
userInput
;
// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
return
<
div
{ userInput } < / div
; // If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first import DOMPurify from 'dompurify' ; const clean = DOMPurify . sanitize ( userInput ) ; 4. Broken Access Control // Always check authorization, not just authentication app . patch ( '/api/tasks/:id' , authenticate , async ( req , res ) => { const task = await taskService . findById ( req . params . id ) ; // Check that the authenticated user owns this resource if ( task . ownerId !== req . user . id ) { return res . status ( 403 ) . json ( { error : { code : 'FORBIDDEN' , message : 'Not authorized to modify this task' } } ) ; } // Proceed with update const updated = await taskService . update ( req . params . id , req . body ) ; return res . json ( updated ) ; } ) ; 5. Security Misconfiguration // Security headers (use helmet for Express) import helmet from 'helmet' ; app . use ( helmet ( ) ) ; // Content Security Policy app . use ( helmet . contentSecurityPolicy ( { directives : { defaultSrc : [ "'self'" ] , scriptSrc : [ "'self'" ] , styleSrc : [ "'self'" , "'unsafe-inline'" ] , // Tighten if possible imgSrc : [ "'self'" , 'data:' , 'https:' ] , connectSrc : [ "'self'" ] , } , } ) ) ; // CORS — restrict to known origins app . use ( cors ( { origin : process . env . ALLOWED_ORIGINS ?. split ( ',' ) || 'http://localhost:3000' , credentials : true , } ) ) ; 6. Sensitive Data Exposure // Never return sensitive fields in API responses function sanitizeUser ( user : UserRecord ) : PublicUser { const { passwordHash , resetToken , ... publicFields } = user ; return publicFields ; } // Use environment variables for secrets const API_KEY = process . env . STRIPE_API_KEY ; if ( ! API_KEY ) throw new Error ( 'STRIPE_API_KEY not configured' ) ; Input Validation Patterns Schema Validation at Boundaries import { z } from 'zod' ; const CreateTaskSchema = z . object ( { title : z . string ( ) . min ( 1 ) . max ( 200 ) . trim ( ) , description : z . string ( ) . max ( 2000 ) . optional ( ) , priority : z . enum ( [ 'low' , 'medium' , 'high' ] ) . default ( 'medium' ) , dueDate : z . string ( ) . datetime ( ) . optional ( ) , } ) ; // Validate at the route handler app . post ( '/api/tasks' , async ( req , res ) => { const result = CreateTaskSchema . safeParse ( req . body ) ; if ( ! result . success ) { return res . status ( 422 ) . json ( { error : { code : 'VALIDATION_ERROR' , message : 'Invalid input' , details : result . error . flatten ( ) , } , } ) ; } // result.data is now typed and validated const task = await taskService . create ( result . data ) ; return res . status ( 201 ) . json ( task ) ; } ) ; File Upload Safety // Restrict file types and sizes const ALLOWED_TYPES = [ 'image/jpeg' , 'image/png' , 'image/webp' ] ; const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024 ; // 5MB function validateUpload ( file : UploadedFile ) { if ( ! ALLOWED_TYPES . includes ( file . mimetype ) ) { throw new ValidationError ( 'File type not allowed' ) ; } if ( file . size
MAX_SIZE ) { throw new ValidationError ( 'File too large (max 5MB)' ) ; } // Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical } Triaging npm audit Results Not all audit findings require immediate action. Use this decision tree: npm audit reports a vulnerability ├── Severity: critical or high │ ├── Is the vulnerable code reachable in your app? │ │ ├── YES --> Fix immediately (update, patch, or replace the dependency) │ │ └── NO (dev-only dep, unused code path) --> Fix soon, but not a blocker │ └── Is a fix available? │ ├── YES --> Update to the patched version │ └── NO --> Check for workarounds, consider replacing the dependency, or add to allowlist with a review date ├── Severity: moderate │ ├── Reachable in production? --> Fix in the next release cycle │ └── Dev-only? --> Fix when convenient, track in backlog └── Severity: low └── Track and fix during regular dependency updates Key questions: Is the vulnerable function actually called in your code path? Is the dependency a runtime dependency or dev-only? Is the vulnerability exploitable given your deployment context (e.g., a server-side vulnerability in a client-only app)? When you defer a fix, document the reason and set a review date. Rate Limiting import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit' ; // General API rate limit app . use ( '/api/' , rateLimit ( { windowMs : 15 * 60 * 1000 , // 15 minutes max : 100 , // 100 requests per window standardHeaders : true , legacyHeaders : false , } ) ) ; // Stricter limit for auth endpoints app . use ( '/api/auth/' , rateLimit ( { windowMs : 15 * 60 * 1000 , max : 10 , // 10 attempts per 15 minutes } ) ) ; Secrets Management .env files: ├── .env.example → Committed (template with placeholder values) ├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets) └── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides) .gitignore must include: .env .env.local .env..local .pem *.key Always check before committing:
Check for accidentally staged secrets
git diff --cached | grep -i "password|secret|api_key|token" Security Review Checklist
Authentication
[ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12)
[ ] Session tokens are httpOnly, secure, sameSite
[ ] Login has rate limiting
[ ] Password reset tokens expire
Authorization
[ ] Every endpoint checks user permissions
[ ] Users can only access their own resources
[ ] Admin actions require admin role verification
Input
[ ] All user input validated at the boundary
[ ] SQL queries are parameterized
[ ] HTML output is encoded/escaped
Data
[ ] No secrets in code or version control
[ ] Sensitive fields excluded from API responses
[ ] PII encrypted at rest (if applicable)
Infrastructure
[ ] Security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, etc.)
[ ] CORS restricted to known origins
[ ] Dependencies audited for vulnerabilities
[ ] Error messages don't expose internals See Also For detailed security checklists and pre-commit verification steps, see references/security-checklist.md . Common Rationalizations Rationalization Reality "This is an internal tool, security doesn't matter" Internal tools get compromised. Attackers target the weakest link. "We'll add security later" Security retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in. Add it now. "No one would try to exploit this" Automated scanners will find it. Security by obscurity is not security. "The framework handles security" Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. You still need to use them correctly. "It's just a prototype" Prototypes become production. Security habits from day one. Red Flags User input passed directly to database queries, shell commands, or HTML rendering Secrets in source code or commit history API endpoints without authentication or authorization checks Missing CORS configuration or wildcard ( * ) origins No rate limiting on authentication endpoints Stack traces or internal errors exposed to users Dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities Verification After implementing security-relevant code: npm audit shows no critical or high vulnerabilities No secrets in source code or git history All user input validated at system boundaries Authentication and authorization checked on every protected endpoint Security headers present in response (check with browser DevTools) Error responses don't expose internal details Rate limiting active on auth endpoints