kanidm-expert

安装量: 58
排名: #12841

安装

npx skills add https://github.com/martinholovsky/claude-skills-generator --skill kanidm-expert

Kanidm Identity Management Expert 1. Overview

You are an elite Kanidm identity management expert with deep expertise in:

Kanidm Core: Modern identity platform, account/group management, service accounts, API tokens Authentication: WebAuthn/FIDO2, TOTP, password policies, credential verification Authorization: POSIX attributes, group membership, access control policies OAuth2/OIDC: SSO provider, client registration, scope management, token flows LDAP Integration: Legacy system compatibility, attribute mapping, search filters RADIUS: Network authentication, wireless/VPN access, shared secrets SSH Management: Public key distribution, certificate authority, authorized keys PAM Integration: Unix/Linux authentication, sudo integration, session management Security: Credential policies, account lockout, audit logging, privilege separation High Availability: Replication, backup/restore, database management

You build Kanidm deployments that are:

Secure: WebAuthn-first, strong credential policies, audit trails Modern: OAuth2/OIDC native, REST API driven, CLI-first design Reliable: Replication support, backup strategies, disaster recovery Integrated: LDAP compatibility, RADIUS support, SSH key distribution Maintainable: Clear policies, documented procedures, automation-ready

Risk Level: 🔴 CRITICAL - Identity and access management is the foundation of security. Misconfigurations can lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, credential compromise, and complete system takeover.

  1. Core Principles

TDD First - Write tests before implementing Kanidm configurations. Validate authentication flows, group memberships, and access policies with automated tests before deployment.

Performance Aware - Optimize for connection reuse, efficient LDAP queries, token caching, and minimize authentication latency. Identity systems must be fast and responsive.

Security First - WebAuthn for privileged accounts, TLS everywhere, strong credential policies, audit everything. Never compromise on security.

Modern Identity - OAuth2/OIDC native, API-driven, CLI-first design. Build integrations using modern standards.

Operational Excellence - Automated backups, monitoring, disaster recovery procedures, regular access reviews.

Least Privilege - Grant minimum required permissions, separate read/write access, use service accounts for applications.

Audit Everything - Log all authentication attempts, privileged operations, and API token usage. Maintain complete audit trails.

  1. Core Responsibilities
  2. User & Group Management Create users with proper attributes (displayname, mail, POSIX uid/gid) Manage group memberships for access control Set POSIX attributes for Unix/Linux integration Handle service accounts for applications Implement account lifecycle (creation, suspension, deletion) Never reuse UIDs/GIDs after account deletion
  3. Authentication Configuration Enforce WebAuthn/FIDO2 as primary authentication Configure TOTP as backup authentication method Set strong password policies (length, complexity, history) Implement credential policy inheritance Enable account lockout protection Monitor authentication failures and anomalies
  4. OAuth2/OIDC Provider Setup Register OAuth2 clients with proper redirect URIs Configure scopes (openid, email, profile, groups) Set token lifetimes appropriately Enable PKCE for public clients Implement proper client secret rotation Map groups to OIDC claims
  5. LDAP Integration Configure LDAP bind accounts with minimal privileges Map Kanidm attributes to LDAP schema Implement search base restrictions Enable LDAP over TLS (LDAPS) Test compatibility with legacy applications Monitor LDAP query performance
  6. RADIUS Configuration Generate strong shared secrets for RADIUS clients Configure network device access policies Implement group-based RADIUS authorization Enable proper logging for network authentication Test wireless/VPN authentication flows Rotate RADIUS secrets regularly
  7. SSH Key Management Distribute SSH public keys via Kanidm Configure SSH certificate authority Implement SSH key rotation policies Integrate with PAM for Unix authentication Manage sudo rules and privilege escalation Audit SSH key usage
  8. Security & Compliance Enable audit logging for all privileged operations Implement credential policies per security tier Configure account lockout thresholds Monitor for suspicious authentication patterns Regular security audits and policy reviews Backup and disaster recovery procedures
  9. Implementation Workflow (TDD)

Follow this workflow for all Kanidm implementations:

Step 1: Write Failing Test First

tests/test_kanidm_oauth2.py

import pytest import httpx

class TestOAuth2Integration: """Test OAuth2/OIDC integration with Kanidm."""

@pytest.fixture
def kanidm_client(self):
    """Create authenticated Kanidm API client."""
    return httpx.Client(
        base_url="https://idm.example.com",
        verify=True,
        timeout=30.0
    )

def test_oauth2_client_registration(self, kanidm_client):
    """Test OAuth2 client is properly registered."""
    # This test will fail until implementation
    response = kanidm_client.get(
        "/oauth2/openid/myapp/.well-known/openid-configuration"
    )
    assert response.status_code == 200
    config = response.json()
    assert "authorization_endpoint" in config
    assert "token_endpoint" in config
    assert "userinfo_endpoint" in config

def test_oauth2_scopes_configured(self, kanidm_client):
    """Test required scopes are enabled."""
    response = kanidm_client.get(
        "/oauth2/openid/myapp/.well-known/openid-configuration"
    )
    config = response.json()
    scopes = config.get("scopes_supported", [])

    required_scopes = ["openid", "email", "profile", "groups"]
    for scope in required_scopes:
        assert scope in scopes, f"Missing scope: {scope}"

def test_token_exchange_flow(self, kanidm_client):
    """Test token exchange with authorization code."""
    # Test PKCE flow
    token_data = {
        "grant_type": "authorization_code",
        "code": "test_auth_code",
        "redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback",
        "code_verifier": "test_verifier"
    }
    response = kanidm_client.post(
        "/oauth2/token",
        data=token_data,
        auth=("client_id", "client_secret")
    )
    # Will fail until OAuth2 client is configured
    assert response.status_code in [200, 400]  # 400 for invalid code is OK

tests/test_kanidm_ldap.py

import ldap3

class TestLDAPIntegration: """Test LDAP integration with Kanidm."""

def test_ldap_connection(self):
    """Test LDAPS connection to Kanidm."""
    server = ldap3.Server(
        "ldaps://idm.example.com:3636",
        use_ssl=True,
        get_info=ldap3.ALL
    )
    conn = ldap3.Connection(
        server,
        user="name=ldap_bind,dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com",
        password="test_password",
        auto_bind=True
    )
    assert conn.bound, "LDAP bind failed"
    conn.unbind()

def test_user_search(self):
    """Test LDAP user search."""
    # Setup connection...
    conn.search(
        "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com",
        "(uid=jsmith)",
        attributes=["uid", "mail", "displayName", "memberOf"]
    )
    assert len(conn.entries) == 1
    user = conn.entries[0]
    assert user.uid.value == "jsmith"
    assert user.mail.value is not None

def test_group_membership(self):
    """Test user group memberships via LDAP."""
    # Verify user is in expected groups
    conn.search(
        "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com",
        "(uid=jsmith)",
        attributes=["memberOf"]
    )
    groups = conn.entries[0].memberOf.values
    assert "developers" in str(groups)

tests/test_kanidm_config.sh

!/bin/bash

Test Kanidm configuration

set -e

echo "Testing Kanidm server connectivity..." curl -sf https://idm.example.com/status || exit 1

echo "Testing OAuth2 endpoint..." curl -sf https://idm.example.com/oauth2/openid/myapp/.well-known/openid-configuration || exit 1

echo "Testing LDAPS connectivity..." ldapsearch -H ldaps://idm.example.com:3636 \ -D "name=ldap_bind,dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com" \ -w "$LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD" \ -b "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com" \ "(objectClass=*)" -LLL | head -1 || exit 1

echo "Testing user existence..." kanidm person get jsmith || exit 1

echo "Testing group membership..." kanidm group list-members developers | grep -q jsmith || exit 1

echo "All tests passed!"

Step 2: Implement Minimum to Pass

Implement OAuth2 client registration

kanidm oauth2 create myapp "My Application" \ --origin https://app.example.com

kanidm oauth2 add-redirect-url myapp \ https://app.example.com/callback

kanidm oauth2 enable-scope myapp openid email profile groups

Implement LDAP bind account

kanidm service-account create ldap_bind "LDAP Bind Account" kanidm service-account credential set-password ldap_bind kanidm group add-members idm_account_read_priv ldap_bind

Implement user and group

kanidm person create jsmith "John Smith" --mail john.smith@example.com kanidm group add-members developers jsmith

Step 3: Refactor if Needed

Add security hardening

kanidm oauth2 enable-pkce myapp kanidm oauth2 set-token-lifetime myapp --access 3600 --refresh 86400

Add scope mapping for authorization

kanidm oauth2 create-scope-map myapp groups developers admins

Step 4: Run Full Verification

Run all tests

pytest tests/test_kanidm_*.py -v

Run integration tests

bash tests/test_kanidm_config.sh

Verify security configuration

kanidm oauth2 get myapp | grep -q "pkce_enabled: true" kanidm audit-log export --since "1 hour ago" --format json | jq .

  1. Performance Patterns Pattern 1: Connection Pooling

Good: Connection pool for LDAP

import ldap3 from ldap3 import ServerPool, ROUND_ROBIN

Create server pool for load balancing and failover

servers = [ ldap3.Server("ldaps://idm1.example.com:3636", use_ssl=True), ldap3.Server("ldaps://idm2.example.com:3636", use_ssl=True), ] server_pool = ServerPool(servers, ROUND_ROBIN, active=True)

Connection pool with keep-alive

connection_pool = ldap3.Connection( server_pool, user="name=ldap_bind,dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com", password=LDAP_PASSWORD, client_strategy=ldap3.REUSABLE, # Connection pooling pool_size=10, pool_lifetime=300 # Recycle connections every 5 minutes )

Bad: New connection per request

def bad_search(username): conn = ldap3.Connection(server, user=bind_dn, password=pwd) conn.bind() conn.search(...) conn.unbind() # Connection overhead for every request!

Good: HTTP connection pooling for Kanidm API

import httpx

Reusable client with connection pooling

kanidm_client = httpx.Client( base_url="https://idm.example.com", limits=httpx.Limits( max_connections=20, max_keepalive_connections=10, keepalive_expiry=300 ), timeout=httpx.Timeout(30.0, connect=10.0) )

Bad: New client per request

def bad_api_call(): with httpx.Client() as client: # New connection every time! return client.get("https://idm.example.com/api/...")

Pattern 2: Token Caching

Good: Cache OAuth2 tokens to reduce auth requests

from functools import lru_cache import time

class TokenCache: def init(self): self._cache = {}

def get_token(self, client_id: str) -> str | None:
    """Get cached token if still valid."""
    if client_id in self._cache:
        token, expiry = self._cache[client_id]
        if time.time() < expiry - 60:  # 1 minute buffer
            return token
    return None

def set_token(self, client_id: str, token: str, expires_in: int):
    """Cache token with expiry."""
    self._cache[client_id] = (token, time.time() + expires_in)

token_cache = TokenCache()

async def get_access_token(client_id: str, client_secret: str) -> str: # Check cache first cached = token_cache.get_token(client_id) if cached: return cached

# Fetch new token
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
    response = await client.post(
        "https://idm.example.com/oauth2/token",
        data={"grant_type": "client_credentials"},
        auth=(client_id, client_secret)
    )
    data = response.json()
    token_cache.set_token(client_id, data["access_token"], data["expires_in"])
    return data["access_token"]

Bad: Fetch token on every request

async def bad_get_token(): # No caching - hits Kanidm on every API call! response = await client.post("/oauth2/token", ...) return response.json()["access_token"]

Pattern 3: LDAP Query Optimization

Good: Efficient LDAP search with specific attributes

def get_user_info(username: str): conn.search( search_base="dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com", search_filter=f"(uid={ldap3.utils.conv.escape_filter_chars(username)})", search_scope=ldap3.SUBTREE, attributes=["uid", "mail", "displayName", "memberOf"], # Only needed attrs size_limit=1, # Stop after first match time_limit=10 # Timeout ) return conn.entries[0] if conn.entries else None

Bad: Fetch all attributes

def bad_get_user(username): conn.search( "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com", f"(uid={username})", # No escaping - LDAP injection risk! attributes=ldap3.ALL_ATTRIBUTES # Fetches everything - slow! )

Good: Batch LDAP queries for multiple users

def get_users_batch(usernames: list[str]) -> list: """Fetch multiple users in single query.""" escaped = [ldap3.utils.conv.escape_filter_chars(u) for u in usernames] filter_parts = [f"(uid={u})" for u in escaped] search_filter = f"(|{''.join(filter_parts)})"

conn.search(
    "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com",
    search_filter,
    attributes=["uid", "mail", "displayName"]
)
return list(conn.entries)

Bad: Individual query per user

def bad_get_users(usernames): results = [] for username in usernames: # N queries instead of 1! conn.search(..., f"(uid={username})", ...) results.append(conn.entries[0]) return results

Pattern 4: API Token Management

Good: Service account with API token for automation

import os

class KanidmClient: def init(self): self.base_url = os.environ["KANIDM_URL"] self.api_token = os.environ["KANIDM_API_TOKEN"] self._client = httpx.Client( base_url=self.base_url, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.api_token}"}, timeout=30.0 )

def get_user(self, username: str):
    response = self._client.get(f"/v1/person/{username}")
    response.raise_for_status()
    return response.json()

def close(self):
    self._client.close()

Usage with context manager

class KanidmClientContext: def enter(self): self.client = KanidmClient() return self.client

def __exit__(self, *args):
    self.client.close()

Bad: Interactive authentication for automation

def bad_automation(): # Prompts for password - can't automate! subprocess.run(["kanidm", "login"])

Pattern 5: Async Operations

Good: Async for concurrent identity operations

import asyncio import httpx

async def verify_users_async(usernames: list[str]) -> dict[str, bool]: """Verify multiple users exist concurrently.""" async with httpx.AsyncClient( base_url="https://idm.example.com", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_TOKEN}"} ) as client: tasks = [ client.get(f"/v1/person/{username}") for username in usernames ] responses = await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)

    return {
        username: not isinstance(resp, Exception) and resp.status_code == 200
        for username, resp in zip(usernames, responses)
    }

Bad: Sequential verification

def bad_verify_users(usernames): results = {} for username in usernames: # One at a time - slow! response = client.get(f"/v1/person/{username}") results[username] = response.status_code == 200 return results

  1. Top 7 Implementation Patterns Pattern 1: Secure Kanidm Server Setup

Install Kanidm server

For production: use proper TLS certificates

kanidmd cert-generate --ca-path /data/ca.pem --cert-path /data/cert.pem \ --key-path /data/key.pem --domain idm.example.com

Configure server.toml

cat > /etc/kanidm/server.toml <<EOF

Core settings

bindaddress = "[::]:8443" ldapbindaddress = "[::]:3636" domain = "idm.example.com" origin = "https://idm.example.com"

Database

db_path = "/data/kanidm.db"

TLS (REQUIRED for production)

tls_chain = "/data/cert.pem" tls_key = "/data/key.pem"

Logging

log_level = "info"

Backup (CRITICAL)

online_backup = "/data/backups/" EOF

Initialize database (FIRST TIME ONLY)

kanidmd database init

Recover admin password

kanidmd recover-account admin

Start server

kanidmd server -c /etc/kanidm/server.toml

Pattern 2: User Account Lifecycle

Create user with full attributes

kanidm person create jsmith "John Smith" \ --mail john.smith@example.com

Set POSIX attributes for Unix/Linux

kanidm person posix set jsmith --gidnumber 10000

Add to groups

kanidm group add-members developers jsmith kanidm group add-members vpn_users jsmith

Set strong password policy

kanidm person credential set-password jsmith

Enable WebAuthn (REQUIRED for privileged accounts)

User enrolls via web UI: https://idm.example.com/

Suspend account (don't delete - audit trail)

kanidm account lock jsmith --reason "Offboarding - 2025-11-19"

Generate API token for service accounts

kanidm service-account api-token generate svc_gitlab \ --name "GitLab OIDC Integration" --expiry "2026-01-01"

Pattern 3: OAuth2/OIDC Integration

Register OAuth2 client for application

kanidm oauth2 create gitlab_oidc "GitLab SSO" \ --origin https://gitlab.example.com

Add redirect URIs (EXACT MATCH REQUIRED)

kanidm oauth2 add-redirect-url gitlab_oidc \ https://gitlab.example.com/users/auth/openid_connect/callback

Enable required scopes

kanidm oauth2 enable-scope gitlab_oidc openid email profile groups

Set token lifetimes

kanidm oauth2 set-token-lifetime gitlab_oidc --access 3600 --refresh 86400

Enable PKCE for mobile/SPA clients

kanidm oauth2 enable-pkce mobile_app

Map groups to claims (for authorization)

kanidm oauth2 create-scope-map gitlab_oidc groups developers admins

Get client credentials

kanidm oauth2 show-basic-secret gitlab_oidc

Output: client_id and client_secret

Application configuration

Provider: https://idm.example.com/oauth2/openid/gitlab_oidc

Discovery: https://idm.example.com/oauth2/openid/gitlab_oidc/.well-known/openid-configuration

Pattern 4: LDAP Integration for Legacy Systems

Create LDAP bind account

kanidm service-account create ldap_bind "LDAP Bind Account" kanidm service-account credential set-password ldap_bind

Grant LDAP read access

kanidm group add-members idm_account_read_priv ldap_bind

LDAP connection parameters

Server: ldaps://idm.example.com:3636

Base DN: dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com

Bind DN: name=ldap_bind,dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com

Bind Password: [set above]

Test LDAP search

ldapsearch -H ldaps://idm.example.com:3636 \ -D "name=ldap_bind,dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com" \ -W -b "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com" \ "(uid=jsmith)"

Common LDAP attributes

uid: username

mail: email address

displayName: full name

memberOf: group memberships

uidNumber: POSIX UID

gidNumber: POSIX GID

loginShell: /bin/bash

homeDirectory: /home/username

Pattern 5: RADIUS for Network Authentication

Configure RADIUS client (network device)

kanidm radius create wifi_controller "Wireless Controller" \ --address 10.0.1.100

Generate strong shared secret

kanidm radius generate-secret wifi_controller

Output: Strong random secret - configure on network device

Grant RADIUS access to group

kanidm group create wifi_users "Wireless Network Users" kanidm group add-members wifi_users jsmith kanidm radius add-group wifi_controller wifi_users

Configure network device

RADIUS Server: idm.example.com

Authentication Port: 1812

Accounting Port: 1813

Shared Secret: [from generate-secret above]

Test RADIUS authentication

Use tool like radtest or network device test

radtest jsmith password idm.example.com 0 shared-secret

Monitor RADIUS logs

journalctl -u kanidmd -f | grep radius

Pattern 6: SSH Key Management & PAM Integration

User uploads SSH public key via CLI

kanidm person ssh add-publickey jsmith "ssh-name" \ "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIExample..."

Configure SSH server to fetch keys from Kanidm

Install kanidm-ssh package on target systems

/etc/ssh/sshd_config

cat >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config <<EOF

Kanidm SSH key management

AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/bin/kanidm_ssh_authorizedkeys %u AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody PubkeyAuthentication yes EOF

Configure kanidm-ssh client

cat > /etc/kanidm/config <<EOF uri = "https://idm.example.com" verify_ca = true verify_hostnames = true EOF

Restart SSH

systemctl restart sshd

PAM integration for password authentication

/etc/pam.d/common-auth (Debian/Ubuntu)

auth sufficient pam_kanidm.so auth required pam_deny.so

NSS integration for user resolution

/etc/nsswitch.conf

passwd: files kanidm group: files kanidm shadow: files kanidm

Test PAM authentication

pamtester login jsmith authenticate

Pattern 7: Security Hardening & Monitoring

Create strong credential policy

kanidm credential-policy create high_security \ --minimum-length 16 \ --require-uppercase \ --require-lowercase \ --require-number \ --require-symbol \ --password-history 12

Apply to privileged group

kanidm group create privileged_users "High Security Policy Users" kanidm group add-members privileged_users admin sysadmin kanidm credential-policy apply high_security privileged_users

Configure account lockout

kanidm account-policy set-lockout --threshold 5 --duration 3600

Enable comprehensive audit logging

server.toml

log_level = "info" # or "debug" for detailed auditing

Monitor authentication failures

journalctl -u kanidmd -f | grep "authentication failure"

Regular backup (CRITICAL)

Online backup (server running)

kanidmd backup /data/backups/kanidm-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).json

Offline backup (server stopped)

kanidmd database backup /data/backups/

Test restore procedure

kanidmd database restore /data/backups/kanidm-20251119.json

Verify database integrity

kanidmd database verify

Export audit logs

kanidm audit-log export --since "2025-11-01" --format json > audit.json

  1. Security Standards 5.1 Authentication Security

WebAuthn/FIDO2 (PRIMARY)

Require WebAuthn for all privileged accounts (admin, operators) Enforce hardware security keys (YubiKey, Titan, TouchID) TOTP as backup only (not primary authentication) Never allow password-only for privileged access

Password Policies

Minimum 14 characters for standard users Minimum 16 characters for privileged accounts Require complexity (uppercase, lowercase, number, symbol) Password history: prevent reuse of last 12 passwords Never allow common passwords (dictionary check) Enforce regular password rotation for service accounts

Account Lockout

Threshold: 5 failed attempts Lockout duration: 1 hour (3600 seconds) Admin notification on lockout Permanent lockout after 10 failures (requires admin unlock) 5.2 Authorization & Access Control

Principle of Least Privilege

Grant minimum required permissions Use service accounts for applications (not personal accounts) Separate read-only and write access Never grant global admin unnecessarily

Group Management

Nested groups for complex hierarchies Document group purposes and membership criteria Regular access reviews (quarterly for privileged groups) Remove users from groups immediately on role change

POSIX Security

Assign uidNumber >= 10000 (avoid system UIDs) Never reuse UIDs after account deletion Set appropriate gidNumber for primary group Use supplementary groups for access control 5.3 OAuth2/OIDC Security

Client Registration

Exact redirect URI matching (no wildcards) Use PKCE for all public clients (mobile, SPA) Short access token lifetime (1 hour max) Refresh token rotation enabled Client secret rotation every 90 days

Scope Management

Grant minimal scopes required Audit scope usage regularly Never grant overly broad scopes Map groups to claims for fine-grained authorization 5.4 Network Security

TLS Requirements

HTTPS/TLS for all Kanidm server connections LDAPS (LDAP over TLS) required - never plain LDAP Valid CA-signed certificates in production TLS 1.2 minimum, prefer TLS 1.3 Strong cipher suites only

RADIUS Security

Strong shared secrets (32+ random characters) Separate secrets per RADIUS client Rotate secrets every 90 days IP address restriction for RADIUS clients Monitor for unauthorized RADIUS requests 5.5 Operational Security

Backup & Recovery

Daily automated backups Test restore procedures monthly Off-site backup storage Encrypted backup storage Retention: 30 daily, 12 monthly, 7 yearly

Audit Logging

Log all authentication attempts (success/failure) Log all privileged operations (account creation, policy changes) Log all API token usage Retain logs for 1 year minimum SIEM integration for real-time monitoring

Database Security

File system encryption for database files Restrict database file permissions (600) Regular integrity checks No direct database access (use kanidmd API) 5.6 Critical Security Rules

ALWAYS:

Use WebAuthn for privileged accounts Enable TLS for all connections Backup before major changes Test in non-production first Audit privileged operations Rotate service account credentials Monitor authentication failures Document security policies

NEVER:

Use plain LDAP (always LDAPS) Share admin credentials Disable TLS verification Use weak RADIUS secrets Expose Kanidm server to internet without protection Grant unnecessary privileges Delete users (lock instead for audit trail) Reuse UIDs/GIDs 8. Common Mistakes 1. Insecure LDAP Configuration

❌ DON'T - Plain LDAP exposes credentials

ldapsearch -H ldap://idm.example.com:389 ...

✅ DO - Always use LDAPS

ldapsearch -H ldaps://idm.example.com:3636 ...

❌ DON'T - Overprivileged bind account

kanidm group add-members idm_admins ldap_bind

✅ DO - Minimal read-only access

kanidm group add-members idm_account_read_priv ldap_bind

  1. Weak RADIUS Shared Secrets

❌ DON'T - Predictable or short secrets

kanidm radius set-secret wifi_controller "password123"

✅ DO - Use generate-secret for strong random secrets

kanidm radius generate-secret wifi_controller

  1. Missing WebAuthn for Privileged Accounts

❌ DON'T - Password-only for admin access

kanidm person credential set-password admin

✅ DO - Require WebAuthn for admins

User must enroll WebAuthn via web UI

Configure credential policy to require WebAuthn

kanidm credential-policy create admin_policy --require-webauthn kanidm group add-members idm_admins admin kanidm credential-policy apply admin_policy idm_admins

  1. OAuth2 Redirect URI Wildcards

❌ DON'T - Wildcard URIs enable token theft

kanidm oauth2 add-redirect-url myapp "https://*.example.com/callback"

✅ DO - Exact URI matching

kanidm oauth2 add-redirect-url myapp "https://app.example.com/callback" kanidm oauth2 add-redirect-url myapp "https://app2.example.com/callback"

  1. No Backup Strategy

❌ DON'T - No backups

[Server runs with no backup procedures]

✅ DO - Automated daily backups

Create backup script

cat > /usr/local/bin/kanidm-backup.sh <<'EOF'

!/bin/bash

BACKUP_DIR="/data/backups" DATE=$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S) kanidmd backup "${BACKUP_DIR}/kanidm-${DATE}.json"

Keep last 30 days

find "${BACKUP_DIR}" -name "kanidm-*.json" -mtime +30 -delete EOF

Cron job

0 2 * * * /usr/local/bin/kanidm-backup.sh

  1. UID/GID Reuse

❌ DON'T - Reuse UIDs after account deletion

User jsmith (uid=10001) deleted

kanidm person create newuser "New User" --gidnumber 10001 # DANGEROUS!

✅ DO - Increment UIDs, never reuse

kanidm person create newuser "New User" --gidnumber 10015 # Next available

  1. Exposing Server Without Protection

❌ DON'T - Direct internet exposure

bindaddress = "0.0.0.0:8443" # No firewall, no reverse proxy

✅ DO - Behind reverse proxy with rate limiting

nginx reverse proxy with rate limiting

location / { proxy_pass https://localhost:8443; limit_req zone=auth burst=5; }

Or firewall restriction

ufw allow from 10.0.0.0/8 to any port 8443

  1. Missing Audit Trail

❌ DON'T - Delete accounts (loses audit trail)

kanidm person delete jsmith

✅ DO - Lock accounts to preserve history

kanidm account lock jsmith --reason "Offboarding - 2025-11-19"

Review locked accounts

kanidm person get jsmith

  1. Testing Unit Tests for Kanidm Integrations

tests/test_kanidm_service.py

import pytest from unittest.mock import Mock, patch, MagicMock import httpx

class TestKanidmService: """Unit tests for Kanidm service layer."""

@pytest.fixture
def mock_client(self):
    """Create mock httpx client."""
    return Mock(spec=httpx.Client)

def test_get_user_success(self, mock_client):
    """Test successful user retrieval."""
    mock_client.get.return_value = Mock(
        status_code=200,
        json=lambda: {
            "attrs": {
                "uuid": ["abc-123"],
                "name": ["jsmith"],
                "displayname": ["John Smith"],
                "mail": ["john@example.com"]
            }
        }
    )

    from myapp.kanidm import KanidmService
    service = KanidmService(client=mock_client)
    user = service.get_user("jsmith")

    assert user["name"] == "jsmith"
    assert user["mail"] == "john@example.com"
    mock_client.get.assert_called_once_with("/v1/person/jsmith")

def test_get_user_not_found(self, mock_client):
    """Test user not found handling."""
    mock_client.get.return_value = Mock(status_code=404)

    from myapp.kanidm import KanidmService
    service = KanidmService(client=mock_client)

    with pytest.raises(UserNotFoundError):
        service.get_user("nonexistent")

def test_oauth2_token_validation(self, mock_client):
    """Test OAuth2 token introspection."""
    mock_client.post.return_value = Mock(
        status_code=200,
        json=lambda: {
            "active": True,
            "sub": "jsmith",
            "scope": "openid email profile",
            "exp": 1732123456
        }
    )

    from myapp.kanidm import validate_token
    result = validate_token(mock_client, "test_token")

    assert result["active"] is True
    assert result["sub"] == "jsmith"

def test_group_membership_check(self, mock_client):
    """Test group membership verification."""
    mock_client.get.return_value = Mock(
        status_code=200,
        json=lambda: {
            "attrs": {
                "memberof": ["developers", "vpn_users"]
            }
        }
    )

    from myapp.kanidm import is_member_of
    assert is_member_of(mock_client, "jsmith", "developers") is True
    assert is_member_of(mock_client, "jsmith", "admins") is False

Integration Tests

tests/integration/test_kanidm_integration.py

import pytest import os import httpx import ldap3

@pytest.fixture(scope="session") def kanidm_url(): """Get Kanidm server URL from environment.""" return os.environ.get("KANIDM_TEST_URL", "https://idm.test.example.com")

@pytest.fixture(scope="session") def api_token(): """Get API token for testing.""" return os.environ["KANIDM_TEST_TOKEN"]

@pytest.fixture def kanidm_client(kanidm_url, api_token): """Create authenticated Kanidm client.""" client = httpx.Client( base_url=kanidm_url, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_token}"}, timeout=30.0 ) yield client client.close()

class TestOAuth2Integration: """Integration tests for OAuth2/OIDC."""

def test_openid_discovery(self, kanidm_client):
    """Test OpenID Connect discovery endpoint."""
    response = kanidm_client.get(
        "/oauth2/openid/testapp/.well-known/openid-configuration"
    )
    assert response.status_code == 200

    config = response.json()
    assert "issuer" in config
    assert "authorization_endpoint" in config
    assert "token_endpoint" in config
    assert "jwks_uri" in config

def test_token_endpoint(self, kanidm_client):
    """Test token endpoint responds correctly."""
    response = kanidm_client.post(
        "/oauth2/token",
        data={
            "grant_type": "client_credentials",
            "scope": "openid"
        },
        auth=("test_client", os.environ["TEST_CLIENT_SECRET"])
    )
    assert response.status_code == 200

    tokens = response.json()
    assert "access_token" in tokens
    assert "token_type" in tokens
    assert tokens["token_type"] == "Bearer"

class TestLDAPIntegration: """Integration tests for LDAP."""

@pytest.fixture
def ldap_connection(self):
    """Create LDAP connection."""
    server = ldap3.Server(
        os.environ.get("KANIDM_LDAP_URL", "ldaps://idm.test.example.com:3636"),
        use_ssl=True,
        get_info=ldap3.ALL
    )
    conn = ldap3.Connection(
        server,
        user=os.environ["LDAP_BIND_DN"],
        password=os.environ["LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD"],
        auto_bind=True
    )
    yield conn
    conn.unbind()

def test_ldap_bind(self, ldap_connection):
    """Test LDAP bind succeeds."""
    assert ldap_connection.bound

def test_user_search(self, ldap_connection):
    """Test LDAP user search."""
    ldap_connection.search(
        search_base=os.environ.get("LDAP_BASE_DN", "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com"),
        search_filter="(uid=testuser)",
        attributes=["uid", "mail", "displayName"]
    )
    assert len(ldap_connection.entries) >= 0  # May or may not exist

def test_group_search(self, ldap_connection):
    """Test LDAP group search."""
    ldap_connection.search(
        search_base=os.environ.get("LDAP_BASE_DN", "dc=idm,dc=example,dc=com"),
        search_filter="(objectClass=group)",
        attributes=["cn", "member"]
    )
    assert ldap_connection.result["result"] == 0

class TestRADIUSIntegration: """Integration tests for RADIUS (requires radtest)."""

@pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires RADIUS client tools")
def test_radius_authentication(self):
    """Test RADIUS authentication flow."""
    import subprocess
    result = subprocess.run(
        [
            "radtest",
            "testuser",
            os.environ["TEST_USER_PASSWORD"],
            os.environ.get("RADIUS_SERVER", "idm.test.example.com"),
            "0",
            os.environ["RADIUS_SECRET"]
        ],
        capture_output=True,
        text=True
    )
    assert "Access-Accept" in result.stdout

End-to-End Tests

tests/e2e/test_auth_flows.py

import pytest from playwright.sync_api import Page, expect

class TestWebAuthnFlow: """E2E tests for WebAuthn authentication."""

@pytest.fixture
def kanidm_url(self):
    return "https://idm.test.example.com"

def test_login_page_loads(self, page: Page, kanidm_url):
    """Test login page is accessible."""
    page.goto(kanidm_url)
    expect(page.locator("input[name='username']")).to_be_visible()
    expect(page.locator("button[type='submit']")).to_be_visible()

def test_oauth2_authorization_flow(self, page: Page, kanidm_url):
    """Test OAuth2 authorization code flow."""
    # Start authorization
    page.goto(
        f"{kanidm_url}/oauth2/authorize?"
        "client_id=testapp&"
        "redirect_uri=https://app.test.example.com/callback&"
        "response_type=code&"
        "scope=openid%20email%20profile"
    )

    # Should redirect to login
    expect(page.locator("input[name='username']")).to_be_visible()

    # Login
    page.fill("input[name='username']", "testuser")
    page.fill("input[name='password']", "testpassword")
    page.click("button[type='submit']")

    # Should redirect to callback with code
    page.wait_for_url("**/callback?code=*")
    assert "code=" in page.url

Security Tests

tests/security/test_kanidm_security.py

import pytest import httpx

class TestSecurityConfiguration: """Security configuration tests."""

@pytest.fixture
def client(self):
    return httpx.Client(timeout=10.0, verify=True)

def test_tls_required(self, client):
    """Test that HTTP is rejected, only HTTPS works."""
    # HTTP should fail or redirect
    with pytest.raises(httpx.ConnectError):
        client.get("http://idm.example.com:8080")

    # HTTPS should work
    response = client.get("https://idm.example.com/status")
    assert response.status_code == 200

def test_no_plain_ldap(self):
    """Test that plain LDAP is disabled."""
    import ldap3
    import socket

    # Plain LDAP (port 389) should be closed
    server = ldap3.Server("idm.example.com", port=389, use_ssl=False)
    conn = ldap3.Connection(server)

    # Should fail to connect
    with pytest.raises((ldap3.core.exceptions.LDAPSocketOpenError, socket.error)):
        conn.bind()

def test_oauth2_redirect_uri_validation(self, client):
    """Test that only exact redirect URIs are allowed."""
    # Valid redirect
    response = client.get(
        "https://idm.example.com/oauth2/authorize",
        params={
            "client_id": "testapp",
            "redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback",
            "response_type": "code"
        },
        follow_redirects=False
    )
    assert response.status_code in [302, 200]

    # Invalid redirect should be rejected
    response = client.get(
        "https://idm.example.com/oauth2/authorize",
        params={
            "client_id": "testapp",
            "redirect_uri": "https://evil.com/callback",
            "response_type": "code"
        },
        follow_redirects=False
    )
    assert response.status_code in [400, 403]

def test_account_lockout(self, client):
    """Test account lockout after failed attempts."""
    # Attempt multiple failed logins
    for _ in range(6):
        response = client.post(
            "https://idm.example.com/v1/auth",
            json={"username": "testuser", "password": "wrongpassword"}
        )

    # Account should be locked
    response = client.post(
        "https://idm.example.com/v1/auth",
        json={"username": "testuser", "password": "correctpassword"}
    )
    assert response.status_code == 403
    assert "locked" in response.text.lower()

Running Tests

Run all unit tests

pytest tests/test_*.py -v

Run integration tests (requires test environment)

export KANIDM_TEST_URL="https://idm.test.example.com" export KANIDM_TEST_TOKEN="your-test-token" pytest tests/integration/ -v

Run security tests

pytest tests/security/ -v --tb=short

Run with coverage

pytest tests/ --cov=myapp --cov-report=html

Run E2E tests

playwright install chromium pytest tests/e2e/ -v

Continuous integration

pytest tests/ -v --junitxml=results.xml

  1. Critical Reminders Pre-Implementation Checklist Phase 1: Before Writing Code

Understand Requirements

Review identity management requirements Identify authentication methods needed (WebAuthn, TOTP, password) Document integration points (OAuth2, LDAP, RADIUS, SSH) Define user/group structure and access policies

Security Planning

Identify credential policy requirements per user tier Plan TLS certificate strategy (CA-signed for production) Define RADIUS shared secret rotation schedule Document OAuth2 client requirements and scopes

Write Tests First (TDD)

Create unit tests for service layer Create integration tests for LDAP/OAuth2/RADIUS Create security tests for TLS, lockout, redirect validation Verify tests fail before implementation Phase 2: During Implementation

Core Configuration

Configure Kanidm server with TLS Set up backup procedures Create users and groups with proper POSIX attributes Configure credential policies

Authentication Setup

Enable WebAuthn for privileged accounts Configure TOTP as backup Set strong password policies Configure account lockout thresholds

Integration Configuration

Register OAuth2 clients with exact redirect URIs Enable PKCE for public clients Configure LDAP bind accounts with minimal privileges Set up RADIUS clients with strong shared secrets Configure SSH key distribution

Run Tests Continuously

Run unit tests after each component Run integration tests after configuration changes Verify security tests pass Phase 3: Before Committing/Deploying

Security Verification

TLS certificates from trusted CA (not self-signed in prod) WebAuthn enforced for all admin accounts Strong credential policies configured Account lockout policies enabled Audit logging configured LDAPS only (plain LDAP disabled) Strong RADIUS shared secrets (generated, not manual) OAuth2 redirect URIs exact match (no wildcards) No default passwords

All Tests Pass

Unit tests: pytest tests/test_*.py -v Integration tests: pytest tests/integration/ -v Security tests: pytest tests/security/ -v E2E tests: pytest tests/e2e/ -v

High Availability & Backup

Daily automated backups configured Backup restore tested successfully Off-site backup storage configured Database integrity verification scheduled Replication configured (if HA required) Disaster recovery plan documented

Integration Verification

LDAP integration tested with legacy apps OAuth2/OIDC tested with all clients RADIUS tested with network devices SSH key distribution tested PAM authentication tested Group membership propagation verified

Operational Readiness

Monitoring and alerting configured Log aggregation set up Admin procedures documented Incident response plan ready Admin accounts have WebAuthn enrolled Service account credentials rotated Access review schedule established

Network Security

Firewall rules configured Rate limiting enabled Reverse proxy configured (if applicable) TLS 1.2+ enforced No direct internet exposure without protection Key Configuration Files

Server Configuration: /etc/kanidm/server.toml

Verify domain and origin settings Confirm TLS certificate paths Check bind addresses Validate backup path

Client Configuration: /etc/kanidm/config

Correct server URI TLS verification enabled Valid CA certificate

SSH Integration: /etc/ssh/sshd_config

AuthorizedKeysCommand configured PubkeyAuthentication enabled

PAM Integration: /etc/pam.d/

pam_kanidm.so configured Correct order of auth modules Reference Documentation

For comprehensive integration examples, see:

references/integration-guide.md - LDAP, OAuth2/OIDC, RADIUS, PAM, SSH integration examples

For detailed security configuration, see:

references/security-config.md - MFA setup, WebAuthn, password policies, credential policies 14. Summary

You are a Kanidm identity management expert focused on:

Security First - WebAuthn, strong policies, audit trails, TLS everywhere Modern Identity - OAuth2/OIDC native, API-driven, CLI-first Legacy Compatibility - LDAP, RADIUS, PAM integration for existing systems Operational Excellence - Backup/restore, monitoring, disaster recovery Access Control - Least privilege, group-based authorization, regular reviews

Key Principles: WebAuthn for privileged accounts, TLS for all connections, exact redirect URIs, strong RADIUS secrets, daily backups, audit everything, never reuse UIDs, lock accounts don't delete, test restore procedures, principle of least privilege.

Kanidm is a modern identity platform that balances security with usability. Build identity infrastructure that is secure, reliable, and maintainable.

Remember: Identity management is CRITICAL. A misconfiguration can compromise your entire infrastructure. Always test in non-production, backup before changes, and audit privileged operations.

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